Pharmaceutical regulation in Europe and its impact on corporate R&D by Stephan Eger & Jörg C Mahlich
Eger and Mahlich Health Economics Review 2014, 4:23
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/23RESEARCH Open AccessPharmaceutical regulation in Europe and its
impact on corporate R&D
Stephan Eger1 and Jörg C Mahlich2*Abstract
Objectives: Many European countries regulate the markets for prescription drugs in order to cope with rising
health expenditures. On the other hand, regulation distorts incentives to invest in pharmaceutical R&D. This study
aims at empirically assessing the impact of regulation on pharmaceutical R&D expenditures.
Methods: We analyze a sample of 20 leading pharmaceutical companies between 2000 and 2008. The share of
sales in Europe serves as a proxy for the degree of pharmaceutical regulation. We control for other firm specific
determinants of R&D such as cash flow, company size, leverage ratio, growth rate, and Tobin’s q.
Results: Our results suggest a nonlinear relationship between European sales ratio and R&D intensity. Beyond a
threshold of 33% of sales generated in Europe, a higher presence in Europe is associated with lower R&D investments.
Conclusion: The results can be interpreted as further evidence of the deteriorating effect of regulation on firm’s
incentives to invest in R&D.
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In order to reduce pressure on public health care expendi-
tures many European countries regulate their markets for
pharmaceuticals. Both theoretical and empirical studies
show that this approach is indeed associated with lower
drug prices and consecutively with lower health expendi-
tures. Wright [1] for instance applies a game theoretic
framework for modeling price negotiations between a
pharmaceutical company and the regulator. He finds that
in equilibrium regulation leads to lower prices compared
to unregulated markets. This theoretical finding is empir-
ically backed by Danzon and Chao [2] who demonstrate
that countries with strict regulation such as France or Italy
exhibit lower drug prices than the less regulated market
of the United States. Lower prices in turn make it more
difficult for firms to redeem the rising research and devel-
opment (R&D) costs. It is estimated that on average
expenditures of 1 billion U.S. dollars are needed to bring a
new molecule to the market [3,4]. A regulatory regime
that leads to lower drug prices can distort incentives to in-
vest in R&D, which might incur long run economic costs* Correspondence: joerg.mahlich@univie.ac.at
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reproduction in any medium, provided the originduced by a future absence of new drugs and consecutive
lost life years [5]. In this paper we try to quantify the effect
of pharmaceutical regulation in Europe on corporate R&D
investments. We follow the approach of Vernon [6,7] and
take the share of companies’ sales made in Europe as a
proxy for the average degree of European drug regulation.
The firm’s share of sales in enlarged Europe is supposed to
impact its R&D intensity directly. Hence, the higher the
share of sales a firm generates in Europe, the lower is its
overall profitability, and the lower is its R&D intensity.
This relationship has not been studied directly and is the
primary differentiation to the work of Vernon. Vernon
(2003) examined the impact of non-US sales on profits [6]
while Vernon (2005) simulated a drop in pharmaceutical
profit margins of U.S. firms to the level of profit margins
in markets outside the U.S. He then estimated the conse-
quences with regard to pharmaceutical R&D [7].
Our analysis only aims at assessing the relationship be-
tween regulation and corporate R&D. We do not exam-
ine social welfare effects. In the framework of welfare
economics R&D investments constitute costs which can
be balanced out by potential benefits of future drug in-
novations. However, due to long time horizons and high
uncertainty statements on social welfare effects areis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We
briefly describe pharmaceutical regulation in European
countries and review the literature on the impact of
regulation and R&D investments. Then, we introduce
our empirical approach and present the results. The
paper closes with a discussion of our findings.
Regulatory framework in Europe
Pharmaceutical price regulation in Europe has attracted
attention both from academics and policy makers [8-13].
Most European countries employ a huge variety of regu-
lation measures at the same time both on the demand
and on the supply side. Table 1 provides an overview of
different regulation mechanisms that were in place in
Europe as of 2010. In the meantime, Germany has intro-
duced a mandatory Health-Technology Assessment (HTA)
as well. Known as the ‘Arzneimittelmarktneuordungsgesetz’Table 1 Overview of pharmaceutical regulation in Europe
Instrument Co
Supply side regulation: in patent drugs
Price controls: administrative or statutory pricing All
External reference pricing All
Rate of return regulation UK
Negotiations and price-volume agreements Fra
Direct expenditure controls: payback Fra
Direct expenditure controls: price volume agreements Fra
Cost-plus pricing Sp
Supply side regulation: off patent drugs
Tendering for generics pharmaceuticals in primary care Ne
Price capping for generics and linking these to the originator price Ita
Supply side regulation: reimbursement methods
Positive and negative formularies All
Internal reference pricing Ge
Health Technology Assessments (HTA) UK
Lit
Innovative pricing and reimbursement schemes Ita
Demand side regulation: policies towards physicians
Clinical practice guidelines All
Compulsory generic prescribing UK
Financial incentives Fra
Prescription monitoring and audit Be
Demand side regulation: policies towards pharmacies
Control of remuneration (e.g. margins, fees) including contractual arrangements All
Generic substitution Fra
Demand side regulation: policies towards patients
Cost-sharing All
Encouraging use of over-the counter medicines and “de-listing” UK
Source: Kanavos et al. [11].(AMNOG) or ‘Pharmaceutical Market Reorganization Act’
the new regulation has introduced an early benefit assess-
ment of new drugs and links prices to the degree of added
benefit against a comparator drug [14,15]. So far, in only
40% of the assessments an additional benefit was granted
[16]. While the main motivation of the new law was to save
up to 2 billion Euro annually for the statutory health insur-
ance due to heavy deficits at that time [17,18], empirical
evidence is scarce whether this goal has been achieved.
Only Aggerwal [19] claimed to observe a decline of Ger-
man drug prices due to AMNOG. As Germany is a major
reference country for other pharmaceutical markets, this
would have a considerable impact on international prices
as well. As Stargardt and Schreyögg showed, for every Euro
the price is lowered in Germany, the reimbursement price
in other countries decreases up to 36 Eurocent [20].
As both the supply and demand side of the market is
strongly regulated it is difficult to evaluate the effect of auntries
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is to take the set of regulatory measures as a whole and
compare it with the average degree of regulation in other
regions of the world. European regulation is successful
in the sense that it does lower prices compared to an un-
regulated environment. Price comparisons show that re-
tail prices for branded prescription medicines in the
United States are higher than those in key European
markets [21-23]. Comparing wholesale drug prices in 9
European countries Martikanen et al. [24] confirm that
prices were highest in those countries where manufac-
turers are relatively free to set the prices of their prod-
ucts. At the time of their study this was the case in the
UK, Sweden and Denmark. The study of Schulenburg
et al. [25] suggests that supply side measures are more ef-
fective than demand side measures in reducing pharma-
ceutical prices. Sood et al. [26] were able to show that
different regulative measures have different effects on
pharmaceutical revenues with direct price controls having
the largest negative impact, followed by economic evalua-
tions and budgets.
Impact on R&D
Pharmaceutical regulation is associated with lower drug
prices. This does not necessarily lead to a reduction of
pharmaceutical sales as standard economic theory sug-
gests that lower prices increase demand in quantity
units. Hart et al. [27] for instance found that the price of
a treatment does influence physician’s prescription be-
havior. In a framework of a meta-analysis Marin et al.
[28] confirm a negative price elasticity of pharmaceuti-
cals. Their estimates suggest that a price increase of 1%
would reduce demand by 0.209%. Accordingly, an em-
pirical study by Stremersch and Lemmens [29] found
manufacturer price controls to have a small albeit posi-
tive effect on drug sales measured in quantity units.
However, it seems that the additional demand which is
triggered by lower prices does not compensate the price
effect and regulation exerts an overall negative influence
on cash flows and subsequently reduces corporate profit
margins [6]. A reduction of profit margins in turn has a
direct impact on corporate R&D investment decisions.
Theoretical work on this topic has been introduced for
instance by Filson and Masia [30] who present a compu-
tational model in which even small reductions in profit-
ability have substantial impacts on firm success and
innovation. By means of a Markov model Filson [31]
simulates what happened if the U.S. adopted price con-
trols like those in the rest of the world. According to his
calculation, this measure would reduce the number of
new drugs by approximately 75%.
A number of empirical papers confirm the positive re-
lation between profitability and R&D investments. For
U.S. pharmaceutical firms Scherer [32] reports a simplePearsonian correlation between gross profitability and
R&D outlays of +0.92. Trushin [33] and Scherer [34]
find that a 10% cash flow increase gives rise to an in-
crease of R&D investments in the range of 3.6% and
6.1%. A similar value of 5.8% is derived for US medical
device companies [35]. From an industry perspective, a
10% increase of the profit margin leads to a 7.7% boost
of R&D investments in the US [36]. A similar relation-
ship has been confirmed for the Japanese pharmaceutical
industry [37]. This relates to the finding of Acemoglu
and Linn [38] who also show that greater profitability
spurs faster innovation. In their study a 1 percent in-
crease in the potential market size for a drug category
leads to a 4 to 7.5 percent increase in the number of
new drugs in that category.
Some studies directly estimate the link between prices
and R&D investments. According to Giaccotto et al. [39]
a 10% drug price increase corresponds with a 5.8% in-
crease of R&D expenditures. Another interesting study
in this context is from Civan and Maloney [40]. Drawing
on a cross sectional analysis of the prices of 600 drugs
they tried to estimate the relation between the price level
of already marketed drugs and the number of new pipe-
line drugs under development. A 10% price decrease
goes along with a 2.8% to 4.9% decline of pipeline drugs.
When it comes to a comparison between Europe and
the U.S. Vernon’s [6] results suggest that an increase of
10% in share of sales made in the non U.S. market result
in a decline of 2.7% to 3.5% in profit margins. He used a
panel data set containing the 20 biggest pharmaceutical
companies from 1994 to 1999. The main assumption
was that drug prices in the U.S. largely remain unregu-
lated compared with the rest of the world, therefore he
used the share of companies’ sales made in the non U.S.
market as indicator of regulation. In a next step Vernon
[7] identifies lagged cash flow and expected profits to be
key determinants of pharmaceutical companies’ R&D
spending. Both R&D drivers identified are influenced by
regulation. For his estimation he used a panel data set of
the 14 biggest pharmaceutical companies in the period
of 1994 to 1997. Again, he assumes drug prices in the
U.S. to be less regulated compared to the rest of the
world. He then tried to simulate how a new policy
regulating pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. affects
R&D investment. According to this simulation, a policy
which would regulate the U.S. prices in a way equiva-
lent to the rest of the world would results in a decline
in firms’ R&D expenditures in the range of 23.4 and
32.7 percent. Golec and Vernon [41] estimate the for-
gone R&D investments in Europe that have been in-
duced by European price regulation. Between 1986
und 2004 European price regulation has impeded
$4.96 bn (in 1986 $) of R&D investments according to
their simulations. Those forgone investments would
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troduced by Brouwers et al. [42] who state that the
drug price level within the OECD countries would
have been 35%-45% higher in the absence of price
regulation. Higher prices would have triggered add-
itional annual R&D investments of $17–22 bn which
in turn would have resulted in ten to thirteen new drug
introductions per year. Another exciting work was pub-
lished by Abbot and Vernon [5]. They perform a prospect-
ive micro-simulation and use Monte Carlo simulation
techniques. According to their results, a price cut of 40 to
50 percent of drug prices in the U.S. would lead to a de-
cline between 30 and 60 percent of investments in early-
stage development projects.
Yet another approach to capture the impact of price
regulation on R&D spending was introduced by Santerre
et al. [43]. The authors argue that even in the U.S. mar-
ket a certain kind of government influenced is asserted
on drug prices. Bargaining power of the national Centers
of Medicaid and Medicare services result in lower drug
prices. According to their estimations drug prices would
be 28% higher in the absence of Medicare/Medicaid
programs. Due to the lower drug prices $256 bn of R&D
investments have been withheld.
Summing up, the narrative review of the existing lit-
erature reveals detrimental effects of price regulation on
R&D investments. This finding leads us to formulate the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Due to pharmaceutical regulation in Europe
we expect that firms which make a bigger fraction of their
sales in Europe do invest less in R&D as they are not able
to fully recoup their R&D expenditures.
We do expect that this relationship does not exhibit a
linear relationship because R&D costs can be regarded
as sunk costs and globally operating firms need to sell
their products in all major markets as long as the mar-
ginal net returns exceed the marginal costs of selling.
The a priori incentives to invest in R&D, on the other
hand, are greater for firms whose products fit the spe-
cific medical needs of the U.S. patients and therefore are
overrepresented in the U.S. market.
Methods
We analyze a panel data set that contains annual informa-
tion of a sample of the world’s biggest 20 pharmaceutical
companies between 2000 and 2008, namely Abbot, Amgen,
Astellas, AstraZeneca, Baxter, Bayer, BristolMyersSquibb,
Eisai, Eli Lilly, GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Merck,
Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, Roche, Sanofi-Aventis,
Schering-Plough, Takeda, and Wyeth. All financial data are
from the Compustat Global database. Regional market share
data are from IMS, an international private market researchcompany. The observation time period was selected because
of data availability and because the absence of merger activ-
ities that would have complicated our analysis.
In line with Vernon [6,7], we take the share of companies’
sales made in Europe as an indicator of average European
regulation. To test the relationship between European sales
and R&D investments we put equation (1) forward:
RDit ¼ aþ b MSEMAit þ c MSEMAit
 2
þ c MSROW it þ Control variablesþ μit ð1Þ
with RDit as the logarithmic R&D expenditures divided
by sales of firm i in time t. As robustness check, we also
take the lagged values of the market share variables.
The explanatory variable MSEMA denotes the share
of sales of firm i in Europe (including the markets of
Middle East and Africa, which are still negligible in terms
of size). As mentioned before, we also test for non-linear
effects by including a squared term. The share of sales in
the rest of the world (MSROW) is also included with Japan
as the major representative of this group of countries. As
the U.S. share of sales (MSUSA) is a residual of the sum
of MSEMA and MSROW it is not necessary to explicitly
add MSUSA into the equation. We include the following
control variables:
Size: The hypothesis that links firm size with R&D
intensity goes back to Josef Schumpeter. In his early
work he posited a negative relationship between firm
size and R&D intensity arguing that small
entrepreneurial firms are the engine of innovation [44].
In his later work however, he claimed that the major
source of innovation were large corporations [45],
which had also been observed in the early empirical
literature [46]. For the pharmaceutical industry results
are mixed: Some authors observed decreasing returns
to R&D investments [47-49]. Others suggest significant
returns to size in pharmaceutical research [50]. We
take the logarithmic number of employees divided by
sales (USD) to capture size effects (Employ).
Growth: Growth rates of firms are also quite often linked
to innovation. Hölzl [51] for instance found evidence that
innovation activities and high-growth status are strongly
dependent in Northern Europe. We simply take annual
sales growth in percent as a control variable (Salesgr).
Leverage: There is abundant empirical evidence that
highly levered firms invest less in R&D [52-54] which
might be due to capital market imperfections. We take
logarithmic debt divided by sales to control for the
corporate debt ratio (Leverage):
Tobin’s q: Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of
a firm to its assets and captures the investment
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financial market frictions, a firm invests up to the point
where the marginal value of capital (marginal q) equals
the marginal cost of capital. Under certain
assumptions, the marginal value of capital equals the
average value of capital (average q) [55], which we
include into our equation (Tobin’s q).
Cash flow: While a firm’s cash flow should not
influence investments in perfectly functioning markets
[56], the empirical literature tracing back to Meyer and
Kuh [57] documents a strongly positive relationship
between cash flow and investments. Either asymmetric
information between investors and firms [58-60] or the
separation of ownership and control, which leads to a
principal-agent problem between a firm’s managers and
its shareholders can be made responsible for this
finding [61,62]. As most large pharmaceutical finance
their investments firms with cash flow from existing
products [63], we include the lagged logarithmic cash
flow (USD) divided by sales (USD) (Cash Flow) into
equation (1).
We believe that we include the most relevant determi-
nants of R&D in our equation, although one might think
of additional variables which influence R&D invest-
ments. For instance, on the firm level the impact of the
degree of diversification [64], or organizational compe-
tence [65] have been studied. On a macro level, authors
have taken a look at the role of public R&D spending
and its spillover to corporate R&D [66,67].
We use panel data regression techniques, namely a
fixed effects (FF) model and a random effects (RE)
model. A fixed effects model might be more appropriate
as the companies in our sample were not randomly
chosen but based on firm size. The FE model also allows
for correlation of unobserved heterogeneity with the ex-
planatory variables [68]. On the other hand, the RE
model is more efficient than the FE model when N is
large, T is small and its assumptions are not violated. ToTable 2 Correlation matrix
R&D MSEMA MSROW MSUSA Em
R&D 1
MSEMA −0.339 1
MSROW −0.441 0.006 1
MSUSA 0.590 −0.683 −0.734 1
Employ −0.502 0.618 0.086 −0.482 1
Salesgr 0.119 0.074 0.026 −0.069 −0
Leverage −0.180 0.004 −0.306 0.220 0.2
Tobin’s q 0.177 −0.203 −0.315 0.368 0.2
Cash flow 0.138 −0.135 −0.095 0.161 −0pick the “correct” model is sometimes quite challenging
and strongly dependent on the assumptions that have
been made about the error component [69]. We there-
fore present results for both models.
Results
Table 2 depicts the correlation matrix of the variables. It
can be observed that a high share of European sales is
positively correlated with company size and negatively
correlated with the cash flow and investment opportun-
ities as expressed by Tobin’s q. A high presence in the
U.S. on the other hand goes along with a bigger cash
flow, better investment opportunities, and a higher lever-
age ratio. A high R&D intensity is positively correlated
to the U.S market share and inversely linked to the mar-
ket share in EMA and ROW. Size seems also be nega-
tively related to the R&D intensity.
The results of the multivariate regression are displayed
in Table 3. The overall model fit is reasonably good al-
though the difference between the within and overall R
squared indicate the importance of individual firm ef-
fects [69].
The most important finding is a weak nonlinear rela-
tionship between MSEMA and the R&D intensity. The
higher the share of sales made in the EMA region, the
higher is the negative impact of the squared term, in
other words the more sales a company makes in the
EMA region beyond a certain threshold the higher is the
decline in R&D investment. This threshold value can be
analytically derived by maximizing equation (1), i.e.
δRD=δMSEMA ¼ bþ 2 c MSEMAð Þ ¼ 0 ð2Þ
Rearranging leads to
MSEMA ¼ −b=2 c ð3Þ
Plugging the value of the coefficients b (3.85) and c
(−5.70) into the equation yields 0.33. Hence, the max-
imal R&D intensity for a company is reached at 33 per-
cent of its sales being generated in Europe. Above thisploy Salesgr Leverage Tobin’s q Cash flow
.024 1
09 −0.128 1
21 −0,021 −0.147 1
.082 0.168 −0.133 0.332 1
Table 3 Regression results
Fixed effects Random effects
Coef. t p > t Coef. t p > t
MSEMA 3.850 1.92 0.058* 2.118 1.34 0.179
(MSEMA)
2 −5.704 2.23 0.023** −3.946 1.84 0.066*
MSROW 0.079 0.10 0.919 −0.867 2.42 0.015**
Employ −0.106 1.83 0.071* −0.111 1.93 0.053*
Salesgr 0.115 1.72 0.089* 0.098 1.50 0.134
Leverage −0.063 3.88 0.000*** −0.058 4.14 0.000***
Tobin’s q −0.016 1.15 0.252 −0.019 1.46 0.145
Cash flow 0.024 0.72 0.471 0.006 0.28 0.780





Prob > p 0.000
Prob > chi 0.000
Significant at 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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with decreasing R&D investments. However, this rela-
tionship is statistically significant only in the fixed effects
model. To establish a stronger statistical link one would
have to increase the number of observations for example
by prolonging the sample period. The results do not
alter much when the lagged values of the variables are
used.
The control variables have the expected sign. The debt
ratio is related to a lower R&D intensity while high
growth firms seem to invest more in R&D. Size is nega-
tively related to the R&D intensity as well. As both vari-
ables are expressed in logarithm we can interpret the
coefficients as elasticity. Increasing employment by one
percent is associated with a 0.11 percent decrease of
R&D intensity.Discussion
We find that R&D intensity of a pharmaceutical com-
pany positively correlates to the sales the company
makes in the U.S market, or to put it the other way
round, it is inversely correlated to the fraction of sales
generated in Europe. This result is a confirmation of
Vernon’s [6] study with a more recent dataset. In con-
trast to Vernon whose left hand side variable was the
corporate profit margin, we directly measure the effect
on R&D spending. As the European market share serves
as a proxy of pharmaceutical regulation in our analysis,
we interpret the results as further evidence of the deteri-
orating effect of regulation on firm’s incentives to invest
in R&D that has already been studies by Henry Grabowski
[70]. Price regulation of pharmaceuticals can theoretic-
ally contribute to society’s total welfare by loweringdrug prices and increasing health care access which re-
sults in higher consumer surplus. Conversely, the costs
of regulation might offset this effect when the long term
effects of reduced R&D spending are taken into account.
While modeling welfare effects is beyond the scope of
this paper, we are able to provide additional evidence for
the detrimental effects of price regulation on pharma-
ceutical R&D spending. Another unintended effect of
price regulation is that bio-pharmaceutical foreign direct
investment is channeled into countries with less strict
price controls [71]. Some European firms such as Novartis
moved their entire R&D headquarters to the U.S. [72].
As a result, most new drugs are nowadays originated in
the United States [73-76]. The dominance of the U.S.
market also means that new drug development pro-
grams focus on disease areas with a high prevalence
within the U.S. population such as obesity. Cholesterol
lowering agents such as Pfizer’s Lipitor were the most
successful drugs in the last decade. Because pharmaceut-
ical research is primarily driven by profit expectations,
high prevalence diseases of poorer countries are gener-
ally not in the focus of pharmaceutical R&D investment
decisions [77]. On the other hand, some authors such as
Light and Lexchin [78] claim that R&D investments do
not necessarily lead to drug innovations. Instead, most
R&D investments are channeled into low risk R&D pro-
grams that provide only minor clinical advantages over
existing treatments. Future research should therefore
shed more light on the quality aspects of the outcomes
as regulation may not only decrease R&D spending but
lead to a more efficient use. This argument has received
some attention in the context of environmental regula-
tion and is known as the “Porter Hypothesis” [79,80]. It
was argued that a well-designed regulation can actually en-
hance competitiveness because it can trigger innovation.
Applying this argument to the pharmaceutical industry
regulation could in principle reduce the development of so
called “me-too drugs” (i.e. drugs that are structurally very
similar to already known drugs with only minor benefits to
the patients) while maintaining or even increasing the
number of break through innovations.
The rapid ageing of most European societies makes an
easening of price controls and regulation in Europe ra-
ther unlikely in the near future. Pharmaceutical firms
are probably forced to accept this challenge and need to
respond with an improvement of R&D productivity [81].
Drawing on a data base with 28,000 compounds Pamolli
et al. [82] observe a significant decline of R&D product-
ivity since 1990 as the risk of failure is increasing. The
trend of falling R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical
industry has been termed ‘Eroom’s Law’ [83] in contrast
to ‘Moore’s law’ that describes the productivity jumps in
the semiconductor industry (in fact it is ‘Moore’s Law’
backwards). If the industry fails to increase productivity
Eger and Mahlich Health Economics Review 2014, 4:23 Page 7 of 9
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/4/1/23significantly, some industry observers foresee a gloomy
future. As Paul et al. [84]: p214 put it: “Without a sub-
stantial increase in R&D productivity, the pharmaceut-
ical industry’s survival (let alone its continued growth
prospects), at least in its current form, is in great jeop-
ardy.” In their model, a cost reduction of 50% per new
chemical entity (NCE) is needed to sustain a viable R&D
business model.” How the industry can meet this ambi-
tious target remains an open issue that deserves further
attention. Our results indicate that this problem is un-
likely to be solved through mergers and acquisitions
since company size is negatively related to R&D inten-
sity. Outsourcing manufacturing and research and devel-
opment tasks might another attempt to raise productivity
[85,86]. This move on the other hand might lower the bar-
riers for firms to enter the industry in the long run leading
to even bigger pressure in the future [87].
Another trait of pharmaceutical regulation is that it
does not only influence R&D investment decisions, but
also determines the availability of new drugs. Studying
the effect of external reference pricing Danzon et al. [88]
found the launch delay of new drugs to be positively re-
lated to expected price. Kyle’s [89] research confirmed
those findings. In addition, she concluded that drugs
invented by firms headquartered in countries that use
price controls reach fewer markets and with longer de-
lays than products that originates in countries without
price controls. Another effect of regulation is a change
of the drug market structure. Older work that has stud-
ied the effects of the FDA regulation in the U.S. follow-
ing the Thalidomide drug scandal find smaller firms to
be more affected than larger firms [90,91]. Many small
firms that did not have access to financial resources were
not able to cope with the tighter regulation and had to
leave the market resulting in an increase of market
concentration.Conclusions
Summing up, the high R&D intensity of the pharmaceut-
ical industry largely depends on the unregulated and
profitable U.S. market, making many Americans com-
plain about European “free riding” on U.S. R&D expen-
ditures that are primarily borne by American patients
[92,93]. As the mere amount of R&D expenditures is
only an input factor within the innovation process fu-
ture research should take a closer look at the impact of
regulation on the efficiency of R&D expenditures. An
increase of R&D investment makes economically only
sense if it leads to more drugs that meet an unmet medical
need and make a significant difference to the patient.
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